Sonia Gandhi’s winning strategy by Rajiv Desai”Freedom‚s just another word for nothing left to lose,” sang Janis Joplin in the 1960s. Faced with party factionalism in 1969, Indira Gandhi bought into that sentiment: she split the Congress Party and jettisoned the syndicate of regional satraps and sold the Indian electorate a radical Left ideology. She won that encounter and went on to win a convincing majority in the 1971 election.Sonia Gandhi, who holds her mother-in-law as a model, is confronted with a similar situation. As head of the ruling UPA coalition supported by the Left Front, she has to decide whether her party will be bullied by the Left or strike out on its own. Opinion polls show that if an election were held today, the Congress would win a few more seats, but a call to the hustings would produce another hung Parliament. In my view, the pollsters are probably wrong. Congress would win enough seats to form a government without Left support. Because the commissars of the Left have been shown up as furthering the China-Pakistan agenda and the BJP has lost whatever little credibility it had.It is widely believed that Indira Gandhi won the 1971 election because her party took a sharp Left turn, nationalising ‚Ëœcore industries‚ like banking, steel, insurance and generally steering hard left. For two years, 1969-1971, she ran the government with support from various socialist groups and by pushing a Left agenda. However, the main reason for her triumph was the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Co-operation with the Soviet Union. Since the late 1960s, when the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was negotiated, India‚s major foreign policy goal has been to challenge the discriminatory regime that was formed with a view to freezing membership of the nuclear ‚Ëœhaves‚ club. In 1974, when Indira Gandhi‚s government conducted an underground nuclear test in Rajasthan, it announced to the world its opposition to NPT while simultaneously signalling the country‚s acquisition of indigenous nuclear capability. The test provoked hostile reactions worldwide and led to the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to monitor global nuclear trade, with the particular objective of reining in the Indian programme.That was more than three decades ago. Today India is faced with a different choice. The world is at its doorstep, with capital and technology. But there are constraints. India is not a signatory to NPT, plus it has conducted nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998. Meanwhile, in 1991, the NSG expanded its ambit to include such technology and equipment that could be construed as ‚Ëœdual‚, for civilian or military use. After huffing and puffing about the discriminatory international nuclear regime for nearly 40 years, New Delhi has triumphed. The Indo-US accord on civilian nuclear cooperation represents a milestone foreign policy achievement. In one fell swoop, the accord lifts the restrictions on nuclear trade and dual-use technology; it makes place for India at the global table as a responsible nuclear power and positions it a step away from full-fledged membership of the UN Security Council.Sonia Gandhi understands this, which is why she supported the prime minister and his cabinet as they sought to complete the 123 Agreement with the US. However, both the prime minister and the Congress president backed off from a confrontation with the Left by delaying an approach to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) seeking approval of the safeguards India proposed in the 123 Agreement. Having formed a consultative committee that includes key allies and the Left, the government and the Congress Party have chosen to persist with the deliberations in the hope they can convince the Left that the deal is in the national interest.The decision to delay talks with theIAEA has been widely perceived as capitulation. It is in fact a considered response to the juvenile theatrics of the Left whose leaders are mindless ideologues. The Congress has chosen the wise option of stepping back and trying to reason with Left hotheads. My guess is that the Congress will point out that opposition to the deal benefits Beijing and Islamabad. The prime minister has said very clearly that his government and the Congress party will make every attempt to persuade the Left to see reason.What he left unsaid was what the government will do if the attempt fails; or how long the government will continue with the deliberations. After the crucial next step of seeking IAEA approval, India has virtually no role to play until the US Congress approves the 123 Agreement in a straight up-and-down vote. Thereafter, the Indian government will be required to sign the deal. That could be in the latter half of 2008. By that time, either the Left will have been convinced or there will be a new government in office, most likely headed by the Congress with the support of its current allies excluding the Left.So the choice is now of the Congress: how long will it put up with the Left‚s coarse bullying? With this considered move to step back a bit, Sonia has restored the balance of power in Congress‚ favour. Now it will not be the Left that pulls the plug. Instead, the choice is entirely Sonia‚s.(Rajiv Desai is a well known Delhi-based columnist and president of Comma)